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ABSTRACT
Performance-related incentive pay for teachers is being introduced in many countries, but there is
little evidence of its effects. This paper evaluates a rank-order tournament among teachers of
English, Hebrew, and mathematics in Israel. Teachers were rewarded with cash bonuses for
improving their students' performance on high-school matriculation exams. Two identification
strategies were used to estimate the program effects, a regression discontinuity design and
propensity score matching. The regression discontinuity method exploits both a natural experiment
stemming from measurement error in the assignment variable and a sharp discontinuity in the
assignment-to-treatment variable. The results suggest that performance incentives have a significant
effect on directly affected students with some minor spillover effects on untreated subjects. The
improvements appear to derive from changes in teaching methods, after-school teaching, and
increased responsiveness to students' needs. No evidence found for teachers' manipulation of test
scores. The program appears to have been more cost-effective than school-group cash bonuses or








Performance-related pay for teachers is being introduced in many countries, amidst much 
controversy and opposition from teachers and unions alike.
1 The rationale for these programs is the 
notion that incentive pay may motivate teachers to improve their performance. However, there is little 
evidence of the effect of teachers’ incentives in schools. In this paper, I present evidence from an 
experimental program that offered teachers bonus payments on the basis of the performance of their 
classes. The dilemmas and challenges that arise in designing and evaluating teachers’ performance 
incentives relate to teacher’s performance measures, level and structure of the rewards, individual 
versus group incentives, undesired behavioral distortions and spillover or substitution effects of 
incentives. The evidence presented in this paper relates directly to these questions and is based on 
results of a pay-for-performance experiment among a sample of high-school teachers in Israel.  
This paper evaluates an Israeli program that rewarded teachers with cash bonuses for 
improvements in their students’ performance on the high-school matriculation exams in English, 
Hebrew, and mathematics. The bonus program was structured in the form of a rank-order tournament 
among teachers, in each subject separately.
2 Thus, teachers were rewarded on the basis of their 
performance relative to other teachers of the same subjects. Two measurements of students’ 
achievements were used as indicators of teachers’ performance: the passing rate and the average score 
on each matriculation exam. The total amount to be awarded in each tournament was predetermined 
and individual awards were determined on the basis of rank and a predetermined award scale. 
The main interest in this experiment relates to the effect of the program on teachers’ pedagogy 
and effort, on teacher’s productivity as measured by students’ achievements and on teachers grading 
ethics and spillover effects on students’ outcomes in untreated subjects. Two other important questions 
                                                      
1 Examples include performance-pay plans in Dade County, Florida, Denver, Colorado, and Dallas, Texas, in the 
mid-1990s; statewide programs in Iowa and Arizona in 2002; programs in Cincinnati, Philadelphia, and 
Coventry (Rhode Island); and the Milken Foundation TAP program. In the state of California, a policy providing 
for merit pay bonuses of as much as $25,000 per teacher in schools with large test score gains was recently put 
into place.In the UK, the government recently concluded an agreement with the main teachers’ unions on a new 
teachers’ performance-pay scheme starting in 2002/2003, with a budget of nearly £150 million. In New Zealand, 
the government completed a system-wide program of performance-related pay for teachers in 2001. For 
discussion and analysis of these programs, see Clotfelter and Ladd, 1996; Elmore, Abelmann and Fuhrman, 
1996; Kelley and Protsik, 1996. 
2 See Lazear and Rosen (1981), Green and Stokey (1983) and Prendergast (1999) for discussion of the theory of 
individual and group incentives in rank-order tournaments.  
 1are addressed in the paper: did the monetary incentives lead teachers to bias their test scores? How 
effective was the program relative to other relevant interventions? 
Although the program was designed as an experiment, schools were not assigned to it at 
random. Therefore, the search for answers to the foregoing questions was complicated by the 
possibility that the schools included in the program were a selective sample with attributes that might 
be related to students’ outcomes for reasons other than those related directly to the intervention.  
Two alternative identification strategies were used to estimate the causal effect of the program. 
The first was a regression discontinuity (RD) design based on the assignment rule that determined 
program participation. This process was based on a threshold function of an observable assignment 
variable, the 1999 school matriculation rate: schools with this rate equal to or lower than a critical 
value (45 percent) were included in the program; others were excluded. This RD design may be 
described as T = 1{S  <= 45}, where T is an indicator of assignment to treatment and S is the 
assignment variable. I developed two empirical variants on the basis of this RD framework. The first 
was based on a measurement error in S (the variable used to assign schools to the program): S = S
* + ε, 
where S
* is the true rate and ε is a measurement error. The administrators of the program, unaware that 
the assignment variable used was measured erroneously, assigned some schools to the program 
mistakenly. As I show below, ε appears to be essentially random and unrelated to the potential 
outcome. Therefore, T was randomly assigned, conditional on S
*. Since this random assignment 
obtained mostly for schools that were near the threshold, controlling for S
*, potentially in a fully non-
parametric way, defined a natural experiment that may still be viewed as an RD strategy based on a 
covariate that has an element of random variation. This identification strategy was enhanced by the use 
of available panel data (before and after the program) that allowed an estimation of differences-in-
differences estimates in the natural experiment setting. 
A second variant on the RD design, which I used for identification, was based on the classic 
notion of an RD design, i.e., that the likelihood of an S value slightly above or below the threshold 
value of the assignment variable is largely random. If this is true, then treated and untreated schools in 
a narrow band around the threshold might be undistinguishable in potential outcome. However, a 
weaker assumption is based on controlling for parametric functions of S. In other words, conditional 
 2on  X,  we expect no variation in T. I exploited this sharp discontinuity feature in the assignment 
mechanism to define a second, more “conventional,” variation of an RD design to estimate the effect 
of the teachers’ incentive program. Here, as before, I exploited the panel nature of the data and 
embedded the sharp RD identification in a differences-in-differences estimation. 
The second identification strategy that I used exploited the very rich and unique data available 
on all schools and students, including many measures of lagged outcomes, to build a comparison 
group by matching. The matching is based on the propensity score matching (PSM) method. The 
availability of various dimensions of lagged outcomes improved the likelihood of matching pupils in 
view of non-observable attributes as well as observable ones. The PSM results were compared with the 
results of traditional regression estimates, which may be viewed as a conventional baseline control 
strategy.  
Section 2 of this paper provides background information about the Israeli school system, 
describes the teachers’ incentive program, and discusses the theoretical context of pay-for-
performance programs. Section 3 discusses the evaluation strategy. Section 4 presents the PSM 
strategy and the results of its application in order to identify and estimate the causal effect of teachers’ 
incentives on the mathematics and English performance of students. Section 5 presents the two 
variants on the RD method and presents the respective empirical results. Sections 6 and 7 present 
evidence of the effect of incentives on teachers’ effort and pedagogy and on teachers’ grading ethics, 
respectively. Section 8 discusses the correlation between teacher attributes—such as quantity and 
quality of schooling, teaching experience, age, gender, and parental schooling—and performance in 
the tournament. Section 9 presents evidence of the relative effectiveness (cost-benefit) of paying 
teachers for performance and other interventions, such as school group incentive programs and 
monetary incentives for students. 
The results suggest that incentives increase student achievements by increasing the attempt 
rate and the passing rate of exams. The improvement appears to come from changes in teaching 
methods, after-school teaching, and increased responsiveness to students’ needs and not from artificial 
inflation in test scores. The evidence that incentives induced improved effort and pedagogy is 
important in the context of the recent concern that incentives may have unintended effects such as 
 3“teaching to the test” or cheating and manipulation of test score and that they do not produce real 
learning.
3 The evidence also suggests that the program did not lead teachers to manipulate or inflate 
test scores. Finally, the cost-benefit comparison of other relevant interventions suggests that financial 
incentives for individual teachers are more efficient than teachers’ group incentives and as efficient as 
paying students monetary bonuses to improve their performance. All three incentive programs were 
more efficient then a program that targeted instruction time to weak students.  
 
2.  Tournaments as a Performance Incentive  
2.1 Theoretical  Context 
Formal economic theory usually justifies incentives to individuals as a motivation for efficient 
work. The underlying assumption is that individuals respond to contracts that reward performance. 
However, only a small proportion of jobs in the private sector base remuneration on explicit contracts 
that reward individual performance. The primary constraint in individual incentives is that their 
provision inflicts additional risks on employees, for which employers incur a cost in the form of higher 
wages. A second constraint is the incompleteness of contracts, which may lead to dysfunctional 
behavioral responses in which workers emphasize only those aspects of performance that are 
rewarded. These constraints may explain why private firms reward workers more through promotions 
and group-based merit systems than through individual merit rewards (Prendergast, 1999). 
In education, too, group incentives are more prevalent than individual incentive schemes. The 
explanation for this pattern, it is argued, lies in the inherent nature of the educational process. 
Education involves teamwork, the efforts and attitudes of fellow teachers, multiple stakeholders, and 
complex and multitask jobs. In such a working environment, it is difficult to measure the contribution 
of any given individual. The group (of teachers, in this case) is often better informed than the employer 
about its constituent individuals and their respective contributions, enabling it to monitor its members 
and encourage them to exert themselves or exhibit other appropriate behavior. It is also argued that 
individuals who have a common goal are more likely to help each other and make more strenuous 
efforts when a member of the group is absent. On the other hand, standard free-rider arguments cast 
                                                      
3  On this point see for example, Jacob and Levitt (2003) and Glewwe, Ilias, and Kremer, 2003. 
 4serious doubt on whether group-based plans provide a sufficiently powerful incentive, especially when 
the group is quite large.
4
Tournaments as an incentive scheme were suggested initially as appropriate in situations 
where individuals exert effort in order to get promoted to a better paid position, where the reward 
associated with that position is fixed, and where there is competition among individuals for these 
positions (Lazear and Rozen, 1982; Green and Stokey, 1983). The only question that matters in 
winning such tournaments is how well one does relative to others and not the absolute level of 
performance. Although promotion is not an important career feature among teachers, emphasis on 
relative rather then absolute performance measures is relevant for a teacher-incentive scheme for two 
reasons. First, awards based on relative performance and a fixed set of rewards would stay within 
budget. Second, in a situation were there are no obvious standards that may be used as a basis for 
absolute performance, relying on how well teachers do relative to others seems a preferred alternative. 
Therefore, we used the structure of a rank-order tournament for the teacher-incentive experiment 
described below. 
 
2.2  Secondary Schooling in Israel 
Lavy (2002) presents the results of a group incentive experiment in Israel (1995–1999), in 
which schools competed on the basis of their average performance and the rewards were distributed 
equally among all teachers in the winning schools. The purpose of the program was to improve 
students’ achievements on the Bagrut (matriculation) examinations, a set of national exams in core and 
elective subjects that begins in tenth grade, continues in eleventh grade, and concludes in twelfth 
grade, when most of the tests are taken. Pupils choose to be tested at various levels in each subject, 
each test awarding from one to five credit units (hereinafter: credits) per subject.
5 The final 
matriculation score in a given subject is the mean of two intermediate scores. The first is based on the 
score in the national exams that are “external” to the school because they are written, administered, 
                                                      
4 See Jenson and Murphy, 1990; Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991; Milgrom and Roberts, 1992; Gaynor and Pauly, 
1990; Kandel and Lazear, 1992; Gibbons, 1998; Malcomson, 1998 and Prendergast, 1999; for a discussion of 
these issues in the general context of incentives. 
5 In Israel, a high school matriculation certificate is a prerequisite for university admission and one of the most 
economically important education milestones. Many countries and some American states have similar high 
school matriculation systems. Examples include the French Baccalaureate, the German Certificate of Maturity 
 5supervised and graded by an independent agency. The scoring process for these exams is anonymous; 
the external examiner is not told the student’s name, school and teacher. The second intermediate score 
is based on a school-level (“internal”) exam that mimics the national exam in material and format but 
is scored by the student’s own teacher. 
Some subjects are mandatory and many must be taken at the level of three credits at least. 
Tests that award more credits are more difficult. A minimum of twenty credits is required to qualify 
for a matriculation certificate. About 52 percent of high-school seniors received matriculation 
certificates in 1999 and 2000, i.e., passed enough exams to be awarded twenty credits by the time they 
graduated from high school or shortly thereafter (Israel Ministry of Education, 2001). 
In early December 2000, the Ministry of Education unveiled a new teachers’ bonus 
experiment in forty-nine Israeli high schools.
6 The main feature of the program was an individual 
performance bonus paid to teachers on the basis of their own students’ achievements. The experiment 
included all English, Hebrew, Arabic, and mathematics teachers who taught classes in grades ten 
through twelve in advance of matriculation exams in these subjects in June 2001. In December 2000, 
jointly with the Ministry, I conducted an orientation activity for principals and administrators of the 
forty-nine schools. The program was described to them as a voluntary three-year experiment.
7 All the 
principals reacted very enthusiastically to the details of the program. One principal changed his mind 
later and removed his school from the program. A survey among all participating teachers showed us 
that 92 percent knew about the program and that 80 percent were familiar with the details of how the 
winners and the size of the bonuses would be determined. 
Three formal rules guided the assignment of schools to the program: only comprehensive high 
schools (having grades 7–12) were eligible, the schools must have a recent history of relatively poor 
performance in the mathematics or English matriculation exams,
8 and the most recent school-level 
                                                                                                                                                                      
(Reifezeugnis), the Italian Diploma di Maturità, the New York State Regents examinations, and the recently 
instituted Massachusetts Comprehensive Assessment System. 
6 Another program, based on students’ bonuses, was conducted simultaneously in a different set of schools and 
there is no overlap of schools in these different incentive programs either in the treatment or control groups of 
this study.  
7 Due the change in government in March 2001 and the budget cuts that followed, the Ministry of Education 
announced in the summer of 2001 that the experiment will not continue as planned for a second and third year. 
8 Performance was measured in terms of the average passing rate in the mathematics and English matriculation 
tests during the last four years (1996–1999). If any of these rates was lower than 70 percent in two or more 
 6matriculation rate must be equal to or lower than the national mean (45 percent). Ninety-seven schools 
met the first two criteria; forty-nine met the third one.
9  
Schools were also allowed to replace the language (Hebrew and Arabic) teachers with teachers 
of other core matriculation subjects (Bible, literature, or civics). Therefore, school participation in 
Hebrew and Arabic was not compulsory but a choice of the school. This choice may have been 
correlated with potential outcome, i.e. the probability of success of teachers in the tournament, 
resulting in an endogenous participation in the program in that subject. Therefore, the evaluation may 
include only English and math teachers. 
 
2.3  The Israeli Teacher-Incentive Experiment  
Each of the four tournaments (English, Hebrew and Arabic, math, and other subjects) included 
teachers of classes in grades 10–12 that were about to take a matriculation exam in one of these 
subjects in June 2001. Each teacher entered the tournament as many times as the number of classes 
he/she taught and was ranked each time on the basis of the mean performance of each of his/her 
classes. The ranking was based on the difference between the actual outcome and a value predicted on 
the basis of a regression that controlled for the students’ socioeconomic characteristics, their level of 
proficiency in each subject, and a fixed school-level effect.
10 Separate regressions were used to 
compute the predicted passing rate and mean score, and each teacher was ranked twice, once for each 
outcome. The school submitted student enrollment lists that were itemized by grades, subjects, and 
teachers. The reference population was the enrollment on January 1, 2001, the starting date of the 
program. All students who appeared on these lists (including dropouts and students who did not take 
the June 2001 exams, irrespective of the reason) were included in the class mean outcomes at a score 
of zero. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
occurrences, the school’s performance was considered poor. English and math were chosen because they have 
the highest failing rate among matriculation subjects. 
9 A relatively large number of religious and Arab schools met all three selection rules. To keep their proportion 
in the sample close to their share in the population, the matriculation threshold for these schools was set to 43 
percent. 
10 Note that the regression used for prediction did not include lagged scores so that teachers will not have any 
incentive to game the system, for example by encouraging students not to do their best in earlier exams that do 
not count in the tournament. This feature would have been important if the program would have continued 
beyond its first year. 
 7All teachers who had a positive residual (actual outcome less predicted outcome) in both 
outcomes were divided into four ranking groups, from first place to fourth. Points were accumulated 
according to ranking: 16 points for first place, 12 for second, 8 for third, and 4 for fourth. The program 
administrators gave more weight to the passing rate outcome, awarding a 25 percent increase in points 
for each ranking (20, 15, 10, and 5, respectively). The total points in the two rankings were used to 
rank teachers in the tournament and to determine winners and awards, as follows: 30–36 points—
$7,500; 21–29 points—$5,750; 10–20 points—$3,500; and 9 points—$1,750. These awards are 
significant relative to the mean gross annual income of high-school teachers ($30,000) and the fact that 
a teacher could win several awards in one tournament if he or she prepared more than one class for a 
matriculation exam.
11  
The program included 629 teachers, of whom 207 competed in English, 237 in mathematics, 
148 in Hebrew or Arabic, and 37 in other subjects that schools preferred over Hebrew. Three hundred 
and two teachers won awards—94 English teachers, 124 math teachers, 67 Hebrew and Arabic 
teachers, and 17 among the other subjects. Three English teachers won two awards each, twelve math 
teachers won two awards each, and one Hebrew teacher won two first-place awards totaling $15,000.  
We conducted a follow-up survey of teachers in the program during the summer vacation after 
the end of the school year. Seventy-four percent of teachers were interviewed. Very few of the 
intended interviewees were not interviewed, most of which due to wrong phone numbers or teachers 
who could not be reached by phone after several attempts. The survey results show that 92 percent of 
the teachers knew about the program, 80 percent had been briefed about its details—almost all by their 
principals and the program coordinator—and 75 percent thought that the information was complete 
and satisfactory. Almost 70 percent of the teachers were familiar with the award criteria and about 60 
percent of them thought they would be among the award winners. Only 30 percent did not believe they 
would win; the rest were certain about their chances. Two-thirds of the teachers thought that the 
incentive program would lead to an improvement in students’ achievements. 
 
2.4 The  Data 
                                                      
11 For more details, see Ministry of Education, High School Division, “Individual Teacher Bonuses Based on 
Student Performance: Pilot Program,” December 2000, Jerusalem (Hebrew). 
 8The data I used in this study pertain to the school year preceding the program, September 
1999–June 2000, and the school year in which the experiment was conducted, September 2000–June 
2001. The micro student files included the full academic records of each student on the Bagrut exams 
during high school (grades 10–12) and student characteristics (gender, parental schooling, family size, 
immigration status-students who recently immigrated). The information for each Bagrut exam 
included its date, subject, applicable credits, and score. Each Bagrut exam is written at the Ministry of 
Education by an independent agency. There are two exam periods, summer (June) and winter 
(January), and all pupils are tested in a given subject at the same date. The exams are graded centrally; 
each exam by two independent external examiners, and the final score is the average of the two. This 
protocol eliminates the possibility of teachers grading their own students’ exams and thereby reduces 
the possibility of cheating.  
The school data provide information on the ethnic (Jewish or Arab) nature of each school, the 
religious orientation (secular or religious) of the Jewish schools, and each school’s matriculation rate 
in the years 1999–2001.  
I defined three outcomes for each subject based on the summer (June 2001) period of exams: 
the number of tests taken by a student in the given subject,
12 the total number of credits that passage of 
these tests confers, and the total credits earned. The second and third measurements reflect the 
proficiency level of the curriculum of each study program. The third outcome was computed only on 
the basis of the scores in the national exams in order not to account for potentially improved 
performance due to simply to teacher’s manipulation of the school scores.  Another important aspect 
of the evaluation is the overall effect of the program on the students’ Bagrut certification. 
Certification—the accumulation of twenty credits or more—is a very important educational milestone 
that is highly rewarded in the labor market and is a necessary ticket to higher education. Estimates of 
the effect of the program on this outcome will be presented along with the subject specific outcomes. 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the 2000 and 2001 cohorts of high-school seniors for 
two samples, the forty-nine schools included in the program and all other high schools. The table 
reveals that the means of students’ characteristics in treated schools differed from the corresponding 
 9means in all other schools. Large differences between the sets of schools were also observed in the 
means of lagged students’ outcomes and school characteristics. By implication, the sample of the 
forty-nine treated schools is not a representative sample of high schools in Israel.  
 
3.  OLS and Propensity Score Matching 
The OLS and propensity score matching approach are used first as a benchmark. Let us define 
the outcome of student i whose teacher participated in the incentive program as   and the outcome of 
a student whose teacher was not included in the program as  . Thus, the effect of the intervention on 
the ith pupil is ( ) and it is not observed because either one or the other outcome is observed. 
The parameter of interest is the estimated effect of treatment on those treated, i.e.,  , 
where T is 1 for students in schools with participating teachers and 0 for students of non-participating 
teachers. What is observed is  , the average outcome for students whose teachers 
participated in the incentive program. An OLS regression is the simplest model that may surmount this 
difficulty and help to construct the counterfactual  . The causal interpretation of the OLS 
estimate, which may serve as a benchmark with which we may compare the results of other models, is 
based on the assumption that we may account for all potential outcome differences between treated 
and untreated students by controlling for their observable characteristics (“selection on observable”). 
On the basis of this assumption, I estimate a model that includes as controls students’ characteristics—
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th-grade students 
in all high schools countrywide. The model may be expressed as: 
(1) Y ij = αj + Xij
’ β + Zj
’ γ + δ Tij + εij
where i indexes students; j indexes schools; T is the assigned treatment status, X is a vector of student-
level covariates, and Z is the vector of school-level covariates. X and Z include, respectively, the entire 
individual and school-level variables presented in Table 1.  
Table 2 presents the OLS estimates of the program effects on the math and English outcomes. 
The standard errors reported in the table are adjusted for clustering, using formulas set forth in Liang 
                                                                                                                                                                      
12  Each matriculation subject may involve more than one exam. For example, the mathematics curriculum 
includes two tests and the English program includes three—two written and one oral.  
 10and Zeger (1986). The treatment-effect estimates in English and math are all positive and significantly 
different from zero. These results suggest that the program caused students to take more exams, 
attempt to earn more credits, and experience a higher passing rate and therefore earn more credits in 
math and English. The size of the effect along each of these channels is similar within each subject. In 
math, the program led to an 18 percent increase in the number of attempted exams and attempted 
credits, relative to the control-group mean of these two outcomes, and to a 14 percent increase in 
credits earned relative to the respective control-group mean. In English, the effects were smaller—a 10 
percent increase relative to the respective mean of the three outcomes—but again, the size of the effect 
was equal for all three outcomes. The estimated effect of the program on the matriculation rate (lowest 
row in Table 2) is an increase of 5.4 percent in the math sample and 4.2 percent in the English sample, 
both significantly different from zero. 
An alternative to the simple model of a controlled regression is identification based on 
matching. Matching may be implemented non-parametrically by defining cells using discrete 
characteristics.
13 The more characteristics there are, however, the harder it becomes to find untreated 
individuals who are identical to treated individuals. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) suggest a solution to 
this dimensionality problem: a weighted index of each individual’s characteristics, referred to as 
“propensity score matching” (PSM).
14 The first empirical step in implementing this method is to 
estimate the propensity score for each student, using a regression of student and school characteristics 
on treatment status.
15 The control sample is restricted to only those observations whose propensity-
score value falls within the range of the propensity score in the treatment sample. By imposing this 
common support condition in the estimation of the propensity score, we improve the quality of the 
matches and avoid a major source of bias (Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd, 1997). Students are matched 
                                                      
)
13 For an application of this method, see Angrist (1998). 
14 To construct the counterfactual   within the propensity-score framework, the following assumption 
is needed: which means that given the observable 
characteristics of students (X
) 1 | ( 0 = i i P Y E
) , , 0 | ( ) , , 1 | ( 0 0
j i i i j i i i Z X T Y E Z X T Y E = = =
i) and schools (Zj), the placement in treatment and control groups is random. Under 
this assumption, it is now well known (see Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) that 
 where  00 ( |1 , P r (1 , | , ) )( | 0 , P r (1 , | , ) EY T T X Z EY T T X Z i i ij i i ij ii == = == ) , | , 1 Pr( j i i Z X T =  is the propensity score 
and is simply the probability of being assigned to treatment given observed characteristics. It follows that the 
counterfactual can be estimated by the sample analog of  , 
where   denotes an expectation about the distribution of the propensity score in the treatment sample. 
))] , | , 1 Pr( , 0 | ( [ ) 1 | ( 0 0
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 11according to their propensity score by the Nearest Neighbor Matching method within 100 intervals.
16 
In estimating the treatment effect by the matching method, corrected standard errors are derived by 
using numerical bootstrapping methods. 
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the treated and control groups in a PSM sample that was 
based on students enrolled in English and math classes separately. The English and math samples were 
different, reflecting the difference in the number of students who took English and math during the 
experiment. All variables that appear in the table were used in the matching equation. Matches were 
found for almost all treated students (95 percent) in both the math and English samples, from 330 
schools in the English sample and from 350 schools in the math sample. 
The first panel in Table 3 shows that the matching process leads to a perfect match since none of 
treatment–control differences is statistically different from zero except for immigrant status. The 
second panel in the table shows that the two samples are also perfectly balanced in all six measures of 
lagged outcomes. These results reinforce our confidence that the two samples are also well balanced in 
terms of unobserved student covariates.
17  
Table 4 presents the results of estimating equation (1) using a sample that includes the treated 
students from the forty-nine schools that were included in the program and their matches as described 
above.
18 The treatment-effect estimates presented in Table 4 are qualitatively very similar to the OLS 
program effect estimates presented in Table 2. Focusing for comparison on the effect of treatment on 
credits earned, the PSM estimate for the math sample is 0.293 while the OLS estimate is 0.228. The 
PSM estimate for English credits earned is 0.145 while the OLS estimate is 0.102. The estimated 
effect of the program on the matriculation rate, based on the PSM method and the math sample, is 
                                                                                                                                                                      
15 Dearden, Emmerson, Frayne and Meghir (2003) provide a recent example of the application of the propensity 
score matching approach in evaluating an education program. 
16  Our unusually rich data, which include many lagged achievement outcomes, probably improves the match of 
important unobserved individual attributes such as ability and motivation. 
17 As another check of the quality of matching, I re-estimated the propensity score model, omitting from the 
equation all lagged outcomes except the math and English lagged credits. I then checked how well balanced the 
treated sample and its comparison counterpart were in terms of the omitted lagged outcomes variables. . None of 
the mean differences of these outcomes (history and biology credits, total credits, average score) was 
significantly different from zero.,   
18 The standard errors were estimated using bootstrapping techniques. To account for clustering in the error term, 
I used a procedure that included, in each round of estimation, a random draw of samples of students (treatment 
and control separately) and a random draw of schools (treatment and control separately). In terms of the 
asymptotic bias in the estimates of the standard errors, the matching on the propensity score has an advantage 
because of the relatively large number of clusters (schools).  
 120.051 (S.E.=0.013), again very similar to the OLS math sample estimate (0.054). The overall close 
similarity between the OLS and the PSM estimates is an indication that a simple control for students’ 
characteristics and lagged outcomes and for school characteristics is quite sufficient in this case.  
  
3.1  Allowing for Heterogeneity in the Effect of Treatment by Student Ability 
As an additional check on the causal interpretation of the results presented in Table 2 and 4, I 
estimated models that allow treatment effects to vary with lagged outcomes. In particular, I allowed for 
an interaction of the treatment effect with the mean credit-weighted average score on all previous 
matriculation exams coding zeros for those who had taken no exams). Using this average score, which 
is a powerful predictor of students’ success in the math and English tests, I coded dummies for each 
quartile of the score distribution. Using the quartile dummies, I estimated the following model for each 
of the three outcome of interest in English and math: 
 (2)        Yij = α + Xij
’β + Zj
’ γ + Σq dqi µq+ Σq δqTj + εij, 
where δq is a quartile-specific treatment effect and µq is a quartile main effect. Students with very high 
scores were likely to be able to take and pass the exams in each of the subjects without the help of the 
program. This claim is supported by the fact that the mean matriculation rate in this quartile in 2000 
was 90 percent. Therefore, one would not expect to find an effect of the teacher-incentive program on 
students in this quartile. In contrast, students with scores around or below the mean of the score 
distribution fell into a range in which extra effort—of their teachers and of themselves—may have 
made a difference. Therefore, I looked for significant estimates for students mainly in quartiles 1–3. 
Table 5 reports results of the estimation of equation (2), which allows treatment to vary by 
quartile of the mean-score distribution in matriculation exams taken before the program, using the 
PSM sample of treated students (the same sample that was used in Table 4). The pattern in the table 
suggests that the average effects reported in Table 4 for all three outcomes originate in the effects on 
the first two quartiles—the below-average students—while no significant effects were estimated for 
above-average students (quartiles 3 and 4). The zero effect on these outcomes in the third and fourth 
quartiles is not surprising since all students in these quartiles were expected to take all exams as 
scheduled. This pattern was evident similarly in math and in English. There were few deviations from 
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positive effects were also evident for students in the third quartile.  
Table 5 also presents results about the effect of the program on the matriculation rate by 
quartile of lagged achievements. The pattern is very similar to that of the other outcomes in Table 5: a 
significant effect for the two first quartiles (in the math sample, for example, increases of 4.1 percent 
and 10.4 percent for students in the first and second quartile, respectively) and no significant effect in 
the upper two quartiles.  
 
4. Regression  Discontinuity 
4.1  Natural experiment due to random measurement error in the assignment variable 
The program rules limited assignment to schools with a 1999 matriculation rate equal to or lower 
than 45 percent (43 percent for religious and Arab schools). However, the matriculation rate used for 
assignment was an inaccurate measure of this variable. The data given to administrators were culled 
from a preliminary and incomplete file of matriculation status. For many students, matriculation status 
was erroneous since it was based on missing or incorrect information. The Ministry later corrected this 
preliminary file, as it does every year.
19 As a result, the matriculation rates used for assignment to the 
program were inaccurate in a majority of schools. The measurement error could be useful for 
identification of the program effect. In particular, conditional on the true matriculation rate, program 
status may be virtually randomly assigned by mistakes in the preliminary file.  
Figure 1 presents the relationship between the correct matriculation rates and those erroneously 
measured for a sample of 507 high schools in Israel in 1999.
20 Most (80 percent) measurement errors 
were negative, 17 percent were positive, and the rest were free of error. The deviations from the 45-
degree line do not seem to correlate with the correct matriculation rate. This may be seen more clearly 
in Figure 2, which demonstrates that the measurement error and the matriculation rate do not co-move; 
their correlation coefficient is very low, at –0.085, even though the p-value that it is different from 
zero is 0.055. However, if a few extreme values (five schools) are excluded, the correlation coefficient 
                                                      
19 To complete the matriculation process, many requirements that tend to vary by school type and level of 
proficiency in each subject. The verification of information between the administration and the schools is a 
lengthy process. The first version of the matriculation data file becomes available in October and the final in 
December of the same year. 
20 The sample was limited to schools with positive (> 5%) matriculation rates.   
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is lower at low matriculation rates, this is most likely due to the floor effect that bounds the size of the 
negative errors: the lower the matriculation rate, the lower the absolute maximum size of the negative 
errors. Similar evidence arises when the sample is limited to the 97 schools that were eligible for 
treatment, those from which 49 schools were assigned for treatment (Figures 3 and 4). If the two 
extreme values in Figure 4 are excluded from the sample, the estimated correlation coefficient between 
the correct 1999 matriculation rate and the measurement error rate, although negative, is practically 
zero. Similar evidence is observed when the sample is limited to schools with a matriculation rate 
higher than 40 percent. In this sample, the problem of the bound imposed on the size of the 
measurement error at schools with low matriculation rates is eliminated (Figure 4A). 
A further check on the random nature of the measurement error can be based on its correlation 
with other student or school characteristics that might be correlated with potential outcome. Table 6 
presents the estimated coefficients from regression of the measurement error on student characteristics, 
lagged students’ outcomes and school characteristics. These regressions were run with school level 
means of all variables, separately for the whole sample (507 high schools) and only for the eligible 
sample (97 schools). The whole set of regressions were estimated twice, once with data of the 2000 
high school seniors and once with the data of the 2001 seniors.  
The first panel of Table 6 presents twenty estimated coefficients from regressions of the 1999 
measurement error on student’s characteristics; only one of these estimates is significantly different 
from zero (the coefficient on percent of immigrant students in the sample of eligible schools in year 
2001). The second panel in table presents twenty-four estimated coefficients from regressions of the 
1999 measurement error on student’s pre-program outcomes, only three of which are marginally 
significantly different from zero. Based on the evidence presented in Figure 1-4 and in Table 6, it may 
safely be concluded that the 1999 measurement error does not correlate with observable characteristics 
that may correlate with potential outcomes.
21
Identification based on the random measurement error can be presented formally as follows:  
                                                      
21 Another possible way to test for the random nature of the measurement error was to test if it is serially 
uncorrelated. However, lacking more than one year of data on the initial matriculation rate and its revised value, 
I so cannot compute the measurement error for any previous years. 
 15Let  S = S
*  +  ε be the error-affected 1999 matriculation rate used for the assignment, where S
* 
represents the correct 1999 matriculation rate and ε the measurement error. T denotes the participation 
status, with T = 1 for participants and T = 0 for non-participants. Since T (S) = T (S
* + ε), once we 
control for S
*, assignment to treatment is random (“random assignment” to treatment, conditional on 
the true value of the matriculation rate). 
The measurement error can be used for identification either as the basis for structuring a natural 
experiment, where treatment is assigned randomly in a subsample of the ninety-seven-school sample 
or as an instrumental variable. Seventeen of the forty-nine treated schools had a correct 1999 
matriculation rate above the threshold line. Thus, these schools were “erroneously” chosen for the 
program. For each of them, there might have been a school with a similar matriculation rate but with a 
random measurement error not large (and negative) enough to drop it below the assignment threshold. 
This amounts to non-parametrically matching schools on the basis of the value of S S
* *. .   Figure 5 shows 
this pairing. The drawn ellipse circles the treated schools and their matching counterparts. There are 
twelve such ellipses. Within this sample (twenty-nine schools) treatment assignment was random, as 
shown above. Therefore, the twelve untreated schools may be used as a control group that reflects the 
counterfactual for identification of the effect of the program. The treated schools in this sample, 
however, are not a random sample culled from the sample of all treated schools, as may be seen clearly 
in Figure 5. For example, the correct 1999 matriculation rate is 45 percent or higher for all schools in 
this sample, while many schools in the full sample have correct matriculation rates that is lower than 
45 percent. One should bear this in mind when interpreting the results, especially in the case of 
treatment heterogeneity. Importantly, however, the range of the 2000 matriculation rates in this sample 
is much wider (for both participating and non-participating schools); it ranges from 32 to 79 percent. 
This wider range of the school matriculation rate mitigates to some extent the limitation in terms of 
external validity of the findings that are based on the RD natural experiment sample. 
Table 7 presents the pre-program (2000) and post-program (2001) means of students and school 
characteristics for the seventeen treated schools and the twelve control schools. The treatment–control 
differences and standard errors in these variables (columns 3 and 6) reveal that the two groups are very 
similar in both years in all background characteristics and in no case are statistically different. The 
 16only non-identical variable is number of siblings, and in 2001 the difference in the number of siblings 
was surprisingly large. 
The second panel in Table 7 presents students’ lagged outcomes for the 2001 senior students. 
These should be viewed as pre-program outcomes. No significant treatment–control differences are 
observed in English and math, in either year. Some differences are observed in history but not in 
biology or in total credits. The differences in history are evident in both years, but they probably 
reflect differences among schools in the timing of the history exam (in eleventh or twelfth grade), 
which is left to the discretion of the school. 
The third panel in Table 7 compares the school-level covariates. Treatment and control are 
balanced in terms of religious status but not in terms of nationality, since there are no Arab schools in 
the control group. The 1999 mean matriculation rate is almost identical in the two groups, an 
unsurprising result since this school-level outcome was used for matching. A similar balance is found 
in the groups’ 2000 matriculation rates. 
The evidence in Table 7 suggests that, generally speaking, the treatment and control schools are 
well balanced in most student and school characteristics. Nevertheless, it is still necessary to control 
for all these variables in the estimation to net out the effect of any remaining differences. Furthermore, 
having similar data for the senior class in the year before treatment (2000) allows us to estimate a 
model with fixed school-level fixed school-level effects by using stacked panel data, which will absorb 
any remaining permanent differences, observed and unobserved, between the treated and the control 
schools. The treatment effect estimated from this model is a difference-in-differences estimate 
embedded in a natural experiment setting. 
 
Estimation and Results 
Applying equation (1) to a school-level panel data structure with fixed school-level effects, the 
following model was used as the basis for regression estimates based on the RD natural experiment 
sample: 
 (3) Y ijt = α + Xijt
’
 β + Zjt
’ γ  + δ Tijt + Φj + η Dt + εijt
where i indexes students; j indexes schools; t indexes years 2000 and 2001, and T is the assigned 
treatment status. As in equation (1), X and Z are vectors of student and school level covariates. This 
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in this model is equal to the interaction between a dummy for treated schools and a dummy for year 
2001 (Tijt  in equation [3] is equal to 1 for treated schools in year 2001 and 0 otherwise). The 
regressions were estimated using pooled data from both years (the two adjacent cohorts of year 2000 
and 2001), stacked as school panel data with fixed school-level effects (Φj) included in the regression.  
Table 8 presents the evidence for two different specification of equation 3, with and without 
the 1999 correct matriculation rate included as a control. The standard errors reported in the table are 
adjusted for clustering, using formulas set forth in Liang and Zeger (1986).
22
The treatment effect in English and math, for all three outcomes, is positive but varies in 
degree of precision. In math, all three outcomes are significantly different from zero and in English 
only the estimated treatment effect on attempted exams is not large enough relative to its estimated 
standard error. The effect of treatment on credits earned in math is 0.256, a 18 percent improvement 
relative to the mean of the control schools (1.46). The effect of treatment on awarded credits in English 
is 0.361, a 17 percent improvement relative to the mean of the control schools (2.11). The relative 
improvement in credits attempted is much lower—7.0 percent in math and 8.4 percent in English. 
These results reinforce the pattern observed in the OLS and PSM results reported above, namely that 
the effect of teachers’ incentives works through two channels: the first increases the attempt rate of 
exams and credits; the second increases the passing rate. The sizes of the two types of effects suggest 
that in the RD natural experiment sample the latter is the more important.  
The interpretation of the foregoing results as causal is based on the random assignment of 
program status by the measurement error, conditional on the actual 1999-matriculation rate. Indeed, 
the treatment-effect estimates are sensitive to the exclusion of the correct 1999 matriculation rate as a 
control. Without this control, for example, the estimated effect of treatment on math credits earned is 
much lower, 0.163 versus 0.256, and is less precisely estimated. The English treatment estimate is also 
lower but only marginally. 
                                                      
22 A disadvantage of the Liang and Zeger method is that the validity of Generalized Estimating Equation 
inference turns on an asymptotic argument based on the number of clusters. The sample of thirty schools may be 
considered too small for asymptotic formulas to provide accurate approximation to the finite-sample sampling 
distribution (Thornquist and Anderson; 1992). However, since I am using school panel data, the number of 
clusters is twice the number of schools since the unit of clustering is defined as the interaction of school and 
year. Therefore, the number of clusters is sixty.   
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obtained by the use of the OLS and PSM methods (reported in Tables 2 and 4, respectively). The 
effect of treatment on math credits earned, for example, is 0.293 in the PSM method and 0.256 in the 
RD natural experiment method. The estimates of the effect on English credits attempted are also 
almost identical, 0.224 and 0.230, respectively. However, some of the other estimates are different; 
e.g., the effect on English credits earned is 0.145 in the PSM method, smaller than the estimate in the 
RD natural experiment method (0.361). 
I also used the RD natural experiment method to estimate models allowing treatment effects to 
vary with lagged outcomes. Using the quartile dummies described in the previous section, I estimated 
the following model for each of the outcomes: 
              (4)        Yijt = α + Xijt
’β + Zjt
’ γ + Σq dqi µq+ Σq δqTjt + Φj + η Dt + εijt, 
where δq is a quartile-specific treatment effect and µq is a quartile main effect. Significant estimates are 
expected mainly for students in quartiles 1–3. 
Table 9 reports results of the estimation of equation (4), using the RD natural experiment 
sample. Significant positive effects on number of exams and credits attempted are estimated, as 
expected, only for students in the first and second quartiles. The quartile pattern of the effect on the 
passing rate in the exams (credits awarded) also reveals a significant positive effect in the third quartile 
in math but not in English. The largest absolute effect on credits awarded is in the second quartile. The 
effect on math is an increase of a half a credit ,against a mean of one credit in the control group, an 
impressive 50 percent increase. In English the effect in the second quartile is an increase of 0.58 
credits against a mean of 2 credits in the control group, implying an increase of 30 percent due to the 
program. However, the most dramatic effects on credits awarded are in the first quartile: a 74 percent 
increase in math (a 0.258 change against the control group mean of 0.347) and a 78 percent increase (a 
0.707 change against the control group mean of 0.911) in English. 
The last panel in Table 9 presents the effect of the program, by quartile, on the matriculation 
rate. A positive and significant effect is estimated only for the second quartile, a 7.6 percent increase, 
which implies a 20 percent improvement against a 38.6 percent counterfactual, the mean of the second 
quartile of the control group. No effect on the matriculation rate is found in the first quartile. 
 194.2  A Sharp Regression Discontinuity Design  
Since the rule governing selection to the program was based simply on a discontinuous 
function of a school observable (the erroneously measured 1999 matriculation rate), the probability of 
receiving treatment changes discontinuously as a function of this observable. This sharp discontinuity 
in the treatment assignment mechanism may be exploited as second RD identification information for 
evaluation of the effects of the teachers’ bonus program.
23 The discontinuity in our case is a sharp 
decrease (to zero) in the probability of treatment beyond a 45 percent school matriculation rate for 
nonreligious Jewish schools and beyond 43 percent for Jewish religious schools and Arab schools. The 
time series on school matriculation rates show that the rates fluctuate from year to year for reasons that 
transcend trends or changes in the composition of the student body. Some of these fluctuations are 
random. Therefore, marginal participants may be similar to marginal nonparticipants. (In this context, 
the term “marginal” refers to those schools that are not too far from the selection threshold.) The 
degree of similarity probably depends on the width of the band around the threshold. Sample size 
considerations exclude the possibility of a bandwidth lower than 10 percent, and a wider band implies 
fluctuations of a magnitude that is not likely to be related to random changes. Therefore, a bandwidth 
of about 10 percent seems to be a reasonable choice in our case. 
This identification strategy may be presented as follows: Let r be the threshold for 
participation (r=45 or r=43), so that I=1(S ≤ r). The participation status for schools in a neighbourhood 
of r changes for non-behavioral reasons. Marginally participant (r
-) and marginally non-participant (r
+) 
schools define “quasi-experimental” groups. The main drawback of this approach is that it allows us to 
estimate the effect for marginally exposed schools only. In the presence of heterogeneous impacts, it 
allows us only to identify the mean impact of the intervention at the selection threshold , which may be 
different from the effect for schools that are far from the threshold for selection.   
There are twelve untreated schools with matriculation rates in the 0.46–0.52 range and 
fourteen treated schools in the 0.40–0.45 range (Figure 6). The 0.40–0.52 range may be too large, but I 
can control for the value of the assignment variable (the mean matriculation rate) in the analysis. Note 
                                                      
23 Regression discontinuity designs were described by Campbell (1969) and were formally examined as an 
identification strategy recently by Hahn, Todd, and van der Klaauw (2001). For recent examples, see Angrist and 
Lavy (1999, 2002a), Hoxby (2000), Lavy (2002), and van der Klaauw (1997). 
 20also that there is some overlap between this sample and the RD natural experiment sample. Nine of the 
fourteen treated schools and five of the twelve control schools belong to the groups of treatment and 
control schools, respectively, in the RD natural experiment sample. However, note that twelve of the 
twenty-six schools (almost 50 percent) included in the sharp RD sample were not among the thirty 
schools that make up the RD natural experiment sample. This suggests that the overlap between the 
two samples still leaves enough “informational value added” in each of the samples. 
Table 10 replicates Table 7 for the sharp RD sample. The treatment–control differences and 
standard errors in the student’s background variables (columns 3 and 6) reveal that the two groups are 
very similar in both years in all characteristics except the ethnicity variable. The proportion of treated 
students of African-Asian origin is lower in treated schools than in control schools; this difference is 
significant in 2000 but not in 2001. The second panel reveals some control-treatment differences in the 
lagged attempt rate of exams and credits in some subjects but only a few of these estimates are 
marginally significant. The third panel reveals a statistically significant treatment–control gap in the 
erroneously measured 1999 matriculation rate and a similar gap in the correct rate. The gap carries the 
expected sign, negative, because all treated schools had erroneously measured matriculation rates 
below the threshold value and all control schools were above the threshold. Given that all 
measurement errors in the discontinuity sample were negative, the treatment–control difference in the 
correct matriculation rate is expected to be negative as well. The two differences are of similar 
magnitudes—0.061 and –0.054—and both had low standard errors. The estimation below will include 
as controls all the variables in Table 10. However, since the measured differences may reflect other 
unmeasured differences, identification based on the sharp RD approach depends more than in the case 
of the RD natural experiment approach on the school constant effects model to net out any remaining 
unobserved fixed correlates of potential outcomes. The lagged outcomes that are included as controls 
also increase the likelihood that many of the remaining confounding factors will be netted out. 
 
Estimation Results  
The sharp RD sample was used to estimate models identical to those estimated with the RD 
natural experiment sample (equations [3] and [4]). In principle, the identification based on the sharp 
RD is conditioned on controlling for the erroneously measured matriculation rate that was actually 
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each regression, control for the 1999 erroneously measured and therefore the latter should not be 
included as a control.  
In contrast to the estimates based on the RD natural experiment sample, there is no reason to 
expect the results based on the sharp RD sample to be sensitive to control for the lagged true 
matriculation rate. However, for the purpose of comparison I again estimated two specifications, with 
and without controlling for the correct 1999 and 2000 matriculation rates even though identification is 
not conditioned on this variable. 
Table 11 presents the results. The treatment-effect estimates are very similar though always 
lower then those obtained using the RD natural experiment sample. The estimates based on the sharp 
RD are expected to be downward-biased because the control group has higher average pre-program 
outcomes. The treatment-effect estimates are positive and significantly different from zero for all 
English and math outcomes except for the number of math attempted-exams outcome, which is only 
marginally significant. The estimated effect on earned credits in math is 0.244 (S.E=0.078), just 
slightly lower in size and precision than the estimate obtained with the RD natural experiment sample. 
The estimated effect on English credits earned is 0.177 (S.E. = 0.104), about half the estimate derived 
from the RD natural experiment and less precisely estimated. 
Note that the treatment estimates in Table 11 are not sensitive at all to the exclusion of the true 
1999 and 2000 matriculation rate as a control variable; the coefficients in the second row of Table 11 
are practically identical to those presented in the first row. This result suggests that the sensitivity of 
the results in the RD natural experiment sample (Table 8) to control of the lagged correct matriculation 
rate was unique to that sample. This result, which may be viewed as a specification check, strengthens 
the credibility of the causal interpretation of the RD natural experiment results, especially given the 
>50% overlap between the two samples.  
Table 12 reports results of the estimation of equation (4), which allows treatment to vary by 
quartile of the distribution of the average score in pre-program matriculation exams, using the 
“discontinuity” sample. The pattern in the table is qualitatively very similar to that of Table 9: almost 
no significant effects are estimated for students with above-average lagged performance (quartiles 3 
 22and 4) and the highest effects are estimated for the second quartile. The effects on the math outcomes 
are also quantitatively similar to those reported in Table 9. However, the results regarding the effect on 
the English outcomes are somewhat lower than those reported in Table 9. The effect on the 
matriculation rate of students is again significant for the second quartile, at an increase of 8.9 percent, 
which is not very different from the 7.6 percent effect shown in Tables 9. However, small positive 
effect is also evident in the first quartile, similar to the respective OLS and MPS results. 
 
5.  Spillover Effects of the Program 
Incentives may induce strategic behavior. For example, teachers may prompt students to 
reallocate their time and effort toward the rewarded subjects at the expense of other subjects. Hence, 
the program may have an adverse effect on outcomes in subjects other than those rewarded. However, 
additional effort on the part of teachers in the program may actually free up some of the students’ time 
for other subjects. In such a case, the effect on outcomes in other subjects may actually be positive. 
This potential spillover or substitution aspect of the program may be addressed by estimating the effect 
of the program on the outcomes of all other “untreated” subjects. However, the number of subjects that 
may be considered truly untreated is limited, for two reasons. First, students are tested in many 
different subjects at the end of twelfth grade and the sample size in some of the tests is very small. 
Second, one should bear in mind that schools were allowed to include in the program teachers of one 
other subject in lieu of Hebrew or Arabic. Therefore, I confine the focus to untreated subjects that had 
the largest sample size—history and biology—and I estimate the effect of the program on the overall 
number of attempted exams, attempted credits, and earned credits in all untreated subjects.  
Table 13 presents OLS, PSM, RD-natural experiment, and sharp RD estimates of the three 
outcomes in history and biology and the three outcomes in all untreated subjects. The estimates vary 
by the methods of estimation used. The OLS and the PSM estimates have a very similar pattern, 
suggesting that the incentive program induced students to take more exams and attempt to acquire 
more credits in history and biology as well as in other untreated subjects, but did not lead to a higher 
success rate in any of the untreated subjects. The estimated effects on attempted exams and attempted 
credits in both history and biology, for example, are positive and marginally significant with t values 
of 1.7–1.8. The size of these effects is relatively large, 25–30 percent of the control-group sample 
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in both subjects: the estimated treatment effect is 0.027 (S.E. = .046) on history credits earned and 
0.054 (S.E=0.019) on biology credits earned. The estimated treatment effect on attempted credits in all 
untreated subjects is 0.468 and its estimated standard error is 0.242. The estimated treatment effect on 
earned credits in all untreated subjects is 0.054 and its estimated standard error is 0.193. On the basis 
of this evidence, it seems that the program led to some increase in the number of attempted credits in 
untreated subjects but had no effect on the respective passing rate. These results do not change when 
the models estimated allow for heterogeneity in the effect of treatment by student ability. 
The evidence on spillover effects is less clear-cut even when estimated on the basis of both 
versions of the RD method. The estimated effects on the biology and history outcomes are very 
imprecisely estimated and vary in signs. On the other hand, the effect on the attempt rate of exams and 
credits in all untreated subjects together is positive though only marginally significant. When 
heterogeneity in the effect of treatment by student ability was allowed, significant effects on these 
outcomes were estimated for students in the second quartile but not for other students. In the second 
quartile, the estimated effect on total credits attempted in all untreated subjects is 0.429 and its 
standard error is 0.323; the respective estimates for total credits earned is 0.578 and 0.331. For all 
other three quartiles the estimated effects are practically zero. These results, as in the case of the OLS 
and PSM estimates, may be viewed as some evidence of spillover effects of the program for students 
in the second quartile of ability.  
 
6.  Do Teachers’ Pedagogy and Effort Respond to Financial Incentives? 
The evidence in the previous section shows clearly that the teachers’ incentive program led to 
significant improvements in students’ achievements in English and math. How closely do these 
improvements correspond to greater effort on teachers’ part? Do they reflect different pedagogy and 
teaching methods? The answers to these questions may shed some light on the concern that financial 
incentives may mainly affect teachers’ efforts to prepare students for tests, in what is often termed 
“teaching to the test”. In such a case any achievement gains merely reflect better test preparation and 
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24 To address these questions, a telephone survey was 
conducted among the English and math teachers who participated in the program.
25 For comparison 
purposes, a similar survey was conducted with a similar number of nonparticipating English and math 
teachers from schools who on average had a matriculation rate equal to that of the treated schools. 
Table A1 in the Appendix shows that the characteristics of the teachers in the two groups are very 
similar.  
Table 14 presents evidence about the effect of the incentive program on three behavioral 
outcomes of participating teachers: teaching methods, teachers’ effort, and focusing of effort on weak 
or strong students. To help interpret the evidence, I should note that preparation for the matriculation 
exams at the end of twelfth grade is the essence and the focus of the curriculum of studies during the 
senior year in high school. Furthermore, high school seniors and their teachers end their regular school 
year in mid-March and spend the rest of the school year preparing for the matriculation exams in 
various ways. Special marathon learning weekends away from school, for example, are very common.  
The evidence, shown for English and math teachers separately, points to two patterns: the 
program modified teaching methods and led to a major increase in teachers’ effort, as expressed in 
overtime devoted to student instruction after the regular school day. Added after-school instruction 
time was also observed among nonparticipating teachers but was more prevalent among participating 
teachers. 
The proportion of program-participant English teachers who taught in small groups is 12.2 
percentage points higher than the respective proportion (59.6 percent) among non-participants (Table 
14). More dramatic and significant differences are evident with respect to the proportion of teachers 
who use individualized instruction and tracking in the classroom by ability: 71 percent and 75 percent 
among participating teachers, respectively, as against 56 percent and 43 percent, respectively, among 
comparison-group teachers. Ninety-three percent of comparison group teachers reported that they 
adapt teaching methods to their students’ ability; 99 percent of treated teachers so reported. Among 
                                                      
24 See, for example, Glewwe, Ilias, and Kremer, 2003. 
25 It is possible that teachers were aware that the survey was part of the incentives experiment and this may have 
affected their responses to these questions. To minimize such a “Hawthorne” type bias, the survey was presented 
to interviewees as a Ministry of Education general survey about matriculation exams and results, and the 
questions about the incentive program were placed at the end of the questionnaire.    
 
 25math teachers, the only significant difference in teaching methods is in the prevalence of tracking by 
ability; this practice was used by 56 percent of program teachers as against 40 percent of comparison-
group teachers.  
One-third of English teachers in the comparison group, as against 37.4 percent of participating 
teachers, reported that they added special instruction time throughout the school year. Among math 
teachers, about 50 percent of participating and nonparticipating teachers added instruction time beyond 
their regular teaching load. This evidence may be regarded as pre-program baseline evidence about 
teachers’ effort because the program did not begin until January 2001. However, the answer to the 
question about added instruction time during the exam preparation period, from mid March to the end 
of June, reveals significant treatment–control differences. The difference is very large, at 20 
percentage points (41.1 percent versus 21.1 percent) among English teachers, and 8 percentage points 
(37 percent versus 29.1 percent) among math teachers. These differences are significantly different 
from zero in both subjects. No significant difference was found among English teachers in terms of the 
amount of instruction time added, about five hours a week in both the treatment and the control 
groups. Among math teachers, however, there was a significant treatment–control difference in this 
parameter, at 5 versus 6.7 hours weekly hours, almost a 35 percent difference.
26 Table 14 however, 
reveals also that the targeting of effort to the weakest students is much more prevalent among 
participating English teachers (39 percent) than among nonparticipating teachers (31 percent). 
Participating math teachers, on the other hand, direct their effort more toward average and strong 
students.  
Beyond showing that the program induced changes in effort and pedagogy, this evidence is 
important because it indicates that the program enhanced forms of teaching and effort that teachers 
already practiced widely before the program started. This pattern greatly reduces the likelihood that the 
improvement in math and English matriculation outcomes reported above are traceable to new 
“teaching to the test” techniques that are less reflective of human-capital accumulation. 
Further evidence that may be relevant, albeit indirectly, to the issue of teaching to the test is 
the impartiality of grading behavior of teachers in the program. The final grade in each of 
 26matriculation subject is an average of two scores: an internal school score given by the subject teacher 
and an external score based on a national exam. Comparison of these two scores shows that there are 
no significant differences between program and non-program teachers in terms of the gap between the 
two scores in English and math. This means that participating teachers did not inflate, in comparison to 
other teachers, the grades that they gave to their students relative to their ability as reflected in the 
external score. Since I showed in Sections 4–6 that students in the program outperformed 
nonparticipating students on the external exams, this implies that the higher absolute scores that 
participating teachers gave their students were matched by an equally improved performance on the 
external exams. 
  
7.  Performance Pay and Teachers’ Grading Ethics 
Incentive schemes may induce behavior distortions as agents seek to game the rules (see, for instance, 
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991). Jacob and Levitt (2003) summarize the evidence on teachers’ 
manipulation of test scores in programs that enhance accountability and also provide evidence on 
outright cheating on the part of teachers and administrators who inflated test scores in various ways. 
The pay for performance scheme used in this experiment may have produced an incentive for teachers 
to inflate the school score as the final matriculation scores is a weighted average of the school score 
and the score in the national matriculation exam and the outcomes for ranking teachers were based on 
the final (weighted) scores. However, the bonus program included an explicit stipulation about 
sanctions that would apply to teachers who, according to Ministry of Education standards, would 
experience large gaps between the school scores and national scores. To assure comparability between 
school-exam and national-exam scores, the Ministry of Education has since 1996 been using a scheme 
(called “Differential Weighting”) that included supervision of the gaps between the school and the 
national scores and a set of rules about sanctions against schools when large gaps are found.
27 The 
                                                                                                                                                                      
26 It should be noted that the teachers were informed that the program is a three year experiment and therefore the 
possibility that the changes in effort reflected simply inter-temporal substitution of effort this year and next.  
27 A Ministry of Education document describes the rules of the Differential Weighting scheme in detail. If the 
average school score in a given exam is higher than the average national score by 20 points or more or if it is 
lower by 10 points or more, the case is considered an outlier. If the probability of such an event is 1:10,000, the 
weights of the two scores are adjusted to 30 percent and 70 percent, respectively, instead of 50 percent each. If 
the probability of such an event is 1:1,000,000, the two scores are weighted at 10 percent and 90 percent, 
respectively. If outliers are defined in 8 percent or more of the exams, in at least two subjects and in two of three 
consecutive years, disciplinary actions are taken against the school. In particular, a ministerial committee may 
 27stipulation in the bonus experiment determined that teachers that will violate the “Differential 
Weighting” rules would be disqualified from the bonus program and consequently will not be eligible 
for bonus payments. However, the “Differential Weighting” scheme leaves still much room for 
teachers to manipulate the school scores and still not violate the rules. For example, only an average 
gap of 20 points or more between the school and national score is considered an outlier (see details in 
footnote 28) and so teachers have enough room to inflate their school scores without violating the 
“Differential weighting” rules.  
In this section I present evidence that show that teachers did not manipulate or inflate the 
school scores as a result of the program. The empirical evidence is based on a comparison of the 
discrepancies of the school and the national score in each exam and a comparison of these gaps 
between treated and control schools while  contrasting the respective evidence from the pre-program 
(2000) and program year (2001). The comparison of the two scores can be viewed as a natural 
experiment since the score in the national exam is an objective unbiased measure of the student’s 
knowledge while the school score may be biased due to teacher’s cheating or other form of test score 
manipulation.    
  Table 15 presents results for three samples: students in treated schools versus students from all 
schools in the country (first panel), the measurement error sample (second panel) and the sharp 
regression discontinuity sample (third panel). As noted above, the evidence pertains to the school year 
in which the bonus program was implemented, 2001, and also for the pre-program year, 2000, which 
will allow for differences-in-differences comparison. Each of the estimates in the table measures the 
difference between the school score and the score in the national exam. The scores were standardized 
to a distribution with zero mean and a unit standard deviation. Standardization was done separately for 
the school and national scores.  
The estimated differences in math in all three treated samples in 2001 and in 2000 are 
negative, indicating that the school scores are lower on average than the scores in the national exams. 
However, all of these differences are not statistically different from zero. The respective differences 
estimated from the three control samples are positive but only one of them is statistically different 
                                                                                                                                                                      
prohibit the school from submitting school scores and advertise its decision in the national print media. Since this 
 28from zero. All the differences in differences between treatment and control school’s means are 
negative, suggesting that teachers in treated schools ‘underestimate’ on average their students’ math 
cognitive ability relative to their performance in the national exams and relative to students from the 
control schools. However, all these differences in differences estimates are not statistically different 
from zero and no systematic pattern of difference is seen for the 2000 and 2001 differences in 
differences as well. 
  The evidence for the English teachers is very similar to those of the math teachers. In all three 
treated samples in 2001 and in 2000 the estimated differences are negative and in all three control 
samples they are positive. However, only in the regression discontinuity sample these differences lead 
to a significant difference in difference estimate between the control and treated samples. But this 
estimate is negative, suggesting again that the English teachers in treated schools ‘underestimate’ their 
students’ cognitive ability relative to their scores in the national exams. Further, this pattern is 
replicated in both the 2000 and the 2001 results. Therefore, based on the evidence presented in Table 
15 it can be concluded that the performance incentive scheme discussed in this paper did not lead 
teachers to inflate artificially their students’ school matriculation scores relative to the state 
matriculation scores in math and English. This could be the outcome of the sanctions implied by the 
Ministry ‘Differential Weighting’ rules, or the threat of being disqualified from the tournament or of 
teachers having in general high ethical grading standards. The similarity of the evidence in the pre-and 
post program period suggests that the impartiality in grading was not a result of the bonus program.   
 
8.  Does Tournament Ranking Correlate with Teachers’ Characteristics? 
The results presented in this paper indicate that individual teachers matter in improving 
schooling quality. Can one predict who the better teachers will be by some conventional measure of 
teacher quality? The correlation between the teachers’ ranking in the tournament and their attributes 
may be used to characterize the good teachers. Estimates of such correlations
28 for math and English 
teachers support the view that teaching quality is not highly correlated with characteristics such as age, 
                                                                                                                                                                      
decision implies significant consequences for the school, it has to be approved by the Ministry director general.  
28 These estimates are not shown in the paper but are available from the author. 
 29gender, education, teaching certification, and years of teaching experience.
29 None of these variables 
was very significant in explaining the ranking of teachers in the tournament.
30 Other variables, 
however, showed significant correlations in the regressions. Being born and educated outside of Israel 
had a positive influence on English teachers’ effectiveness. Among English teachers educated in Israel, 
those who attended universities with the best reputations (the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and Tel 
Aviv University) were significantly more effective than those who attended other universities or 
teachers’ colleges. Among math teachers, the only attribute that had a significant effect on teaching 
effectiveness was mother’s schooling: teachers whose mothers had completed high school or had 
earned a higher academic degree were much more effective than other teachers. No similar effect was 
found for father’s education. 
 
9.  A Cost-Benefit Comparison with Alternative Interventions 
The teacher-incentive program cost $170 per student and improved the matriculation rate by 
about 4 percentage points. The student-bonus program evaluated by Angrist and Lavy (2002) cost 
$300 per student and elevated the matriculation rate by 7 percentage points. The school-incentive 
program analyzed by Lavy (2002) cost $270 per student and boosted the matriculation rate by 1–2 
percentage points. Among the three incentive programs, the student-bonus program was the most 
expensive in per-student terms but it was as effective in cost-equivalence terms as the teacher-bonus 
program when adjusted for its higher impact on the matriculation rate. The group-school incentive 
program was the least effective in cost-equivalence terms among the three incentive-based programs. 
All these programs were more effective than a program that targeted additional instruction time to 
underachieving students in small groups (two to six students) in several matriculation subjects.
31  
Another way of benchmarking costs and benefits is by comparing the program cost per student 
to the likely economic benefits of the improved outcomes, e.g., of earning a matriculation certificate, 
with the cost of about $170 per treated student that led to a 4 percentage-point increase in the 
matriculation rate. One may measure the economic benefit of having a matriculation certificate. 
                                                      
29 See Heckman (2002) and Hanushek (2002) for discussion of this point.  
30 None of the teachers’ attributes was significantly correlated with any of measure of teachers’ effort discussed 
in the previous section. 
 30Angrist and Lavy (2002) estimated the economic benefit of a matriculation certificate to an individual 
who has twelve years of schooling at $4,025 per year. Given that the teacher-bonus experiment raised 
the mean probability of matriculation among treated students by 4 percent, it should increase the 
annual earnings of treated students by 4,025 × .04 = $161 per person per year. This allows the program 
to recoup its cost quickly, just after two years. 
Finally, it is worth noting that teachers’ incentives, beyond affecting motivation, may also 
have a long-term effect by means of the screening and selection of teachers (Lazear, 2000 and 2001). 
Pay for performance will result in higher pay for the better teachers, which may encourage the right 
pattern of retention and turnover of teachers through selection. In other words, a pay-for-performance 
scheme may lead to a different and more productive applicant pool from which teachers are selected. 
Estimating such a long-term effect is not feasible in this study.  
 
10. Conclusions 
The evidence presented in this paper indicates clearly that pay-for-performance incentives 
can align the interests of schoolteachers with the interest of the school system without inducing 
behavior distortions such as test score manipulations or primarily teaching to test practices by 
teachers. This result is evident despite the widely held concern about the team nature of learning in 
school, i.e., the belief that a student’s output is the outcome not of the inputs of a single teacher but of 
the joint contributions of many teachers. The magnitude of the estimated effects and the evidence 
about teachers’ differential efforts under an incentive regime suggest that teachers’ incentives should 
be considered as a promising path toward the improvement of school quality. The results of this new 
experiment add important evidence to those of Lavy (2002) concerning group school incentives.  
The non-random nature of the assignment of schools and teachers to the experiment entailed 
alternative identification strategies. The two variants of the regression discontinuity that I used for 
identification—the natural experiment, based on a random measurement error in the assignment 
variable, and the sharp regression discontinuity—provided appealing approaches to the problem of 
non-random assignment into the incentive pay program. The propensity matching method that I also 
                                                                                                                                                                      
31 The cost of this program was $1,100 per student and it raised the matriculation rate by 11 percentage points 
(Ministry of Education, Evaluation Division, May 2002). 
 31used seems very appropriate in our case because of the rich data that may be used for matching; 
especially test scores from many pre-program high school exams, which are very likely to correlate 
with unobserved student attributes such as ability and motivation. All the methods of identification 
used in this study yielded qualitatively similar results.  
Incentive programs in schools may include all teachers or only those who teach specified 
subjects. Targeting teachers of some subjects may be appropriate if the objective is, for example, to 
enhance the outcome in some subjects or to cope with budget constraints. The targeting of incentives 
to some teachers only, however, may have the drawbacks of jeopardizing the solidarity of the 
teachers in a school and generating negative spillover and externalities. The potential positive effect 
of incentives on targeted outcomes may have unintended negative (or positive) effects on other 
outcomes that may outweigh (or enhance) the positive effect of the incentives on intended outcomes. 
In this experiment, I had a unique opportunity to examine the existence and size of spillover effects 
because the program aimed the financial incentives at only some schoolteachers. The evidence 
presented in this paper suggests that this targeting of incentives led to small and marginally 
significant spillover effects. The spillover effects were more pronounced when their impact was 
allowed to vary by student’s ability but they were positive and significant only for students in the two 
lowest ability quartiles. However, the caveat of this result and for that matter also of the other results 
presented in this paper, is that the experiment lasted for just one year and, therefore, did not allow us 
to study the long-term effects of the incentives.   
On the basis of a post-program survey among participating and nonparticipating teachers, I 
found evidence that links the improvement in students’ cognitive outcomes on the math and English 
matriculation exams to changes in participating teachers’ teaching methods, pedagogical techniques, 
and additional effort during the program. Teaching in smaller groups and tracking students by ability, 
for example, seemed much more prevalent among participating teachers, who also enhanced a 
practice that is very common among all teachers, i.e., adding additional teaching time during the four-
month period in which they prepare students for the matriculation exams. 
The structure of the Israeli matriculation-exam system, which is based on compulsory testing 
at the end of high school and a minimum number of required credits, closely resembles the 
 32corresponding systems used in France, Germany, Italy, New York, Massachusetts, and other 
locations. This resemblance makes the results and lessons of the incentive experiment examined in 
this paper relevant for many education systems in Europe and the US. 
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Other schoolsFather's education 11.499 9.168 -2.330* 11.097 9.160 -1.937*
(0.522) (0.487)
Mother's education 11.441 8.933 -2.508* 10.853 8.701 -2.152*
(0.599) (0.618)
Number of sibblings 2.666 3.421 0.755* 2.618 3.403 0.786*
(0.367) (0.375)
Gender (Male=1) 0.467 0.495 0.028 0.466 0.483 0.017
(0.018) (0.018)
Immigrant 0.024 0.030 0.006 0.015 0.022 0.006
(0.011) (0.009)
Asia-Africa ethnicity 0.179 0.199 0.021 0.169 0.168 -0.001
(0.024) (0.022)
Math credits 0.708 0.394 -0.314* 0.774 0.427 -0.347
(0.093) (0.092)
English credits 0.224 0.129 -0.095* 0.228 0.112 -0.116
(0.030) (0.037)
History credits 0.317 0.213 -0.104* 0.594 0.362 -0.232
(0.038) (0.056)
Biology credits 0.004 0.004 0.000 0.005 0.000 -0.005*
(0.004) (0.002)
Total credits 4.843 3.551 -1.291* 5.018 3.588 -1.430*
(0.219) (0.230)
Average Score 69.362 57.227 -12.135* 70.177 55.612 -14.565*
(1.800) (1.872)
Religious school 0.167 0.195 0.028 0.168 0.180 0.012
(0.060) (0.057)
Arab school 0.154 0.251 0.097 0.153 0.273 0.121
(0.070) (0.074)
Previous year Bagrut rate 0.620 0.407 -0.213* 0.625 0.410 -0.215*
(0.019) (0.021)









Note: The table reports the mean of all variables by treatment and control, the differences of means and their 
standard errors adjusted for clustering using formulas in Liang and Zeger (1986). A * denotes significance level 
at 5% or 10%.
Table 1
 Descriptive Statistics: Program Schools Versus All Other High Schools 





















Attempted Exams 1.14 0.222 0.031 0.85 0.102 0.032
Attempted Credits 1.99 0.333 0.051 2.66 0.250 0.067
Awarded Credits 1.67 0.228 0.064 2.23 0.219 0.071
Bagrut Rate 0.62 0.054 0.018 0.62 0.042 0.017
Note: The table reports treatment-control differences for the three outcomes in English and Math. The sample used to produce 
the results reported in this table include the students that participated in the program and all the other students in the country: in 
math 72,051 and in English 72,378. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the school level using formulas in Liang and 
Zeger (1986) and presented in parenthesis. Students level controls include the number of sibblings, gender dummy, father's and 
mother's education, a dummy indicating an immigrant student, a set of dummy variables for ethnic background, a set of 
dummies for the number of credit units gained in the relevant subject before treatment, overall credit units gained before 
treatment and the average score in the relevant tests.
Table 2





Father's education 9.282 9.297 -0.015 9.471 9.296 0.175
(0.550) (0.541)
Mother's education 8.831 8.733 0.097 9.149 8.918 0.231
(0.697) (0.673)
Number of sibblings 3.342 3.483 -0.140 3.217 3.296 -0.079
(0.394) (0.387)
Gender (Male=1) 0.488 0.471 0.017 0.483 0.471 0.012
(0.025) (0.024)
Immigrant 0.014 0.001 0.014 0.014 0.001 0.014
(0.004) (0.004)
Asia-Africa ethnicity 0.165 0.185 -0.021 0.179 0.210 -0.031
(0.028) (0.027)
Math credits 0.362 0.304 0.058 0.531 0.535 -0.004
(0.081) (0.109)
English credits 0.109 0.160 -0.051 0.060 0.051 0.009
(0.047) (0.023)
History credits 0.442 0.409 0.033 0.453 0.419 0.034
(0.069) (0.069)
Biology credits 0.000 0.002 -0.002 0.000 0.002 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001)
Total credits 4.158 4.101 0.057 4.311 4.256 0.055
(0.288) (0.259)
Average Score 64.225 63.416 0.809 65.047 63.559 1.488
(2.045) (1.857)
Religious school 0.179 0.203 -0.024 0.171 0.185 -0.015
(0.064) (0.062)
Arab school 0.286 0.326 -0.041 0.232 0.253 -0.020
(0.090) (0.081)
Previous year Bagrut rate 0.409 0.423 -0.014 0.422 0.426 -0.004
(2000) (0.024) (0.023)
Number of observations 4,490 4,490 4,865 4,865
Note: The table reports the mean of all variables by treatment and control, the differences of means and




treatment control treatment control
Table 3
 Descriptive Statistics: The Propensity Score Sample Based On Program Participants and their Matches














Attempted Exams 1.13 0.242 0.032 1.00 0.088 0.033
Attempted Credits 1.98 0.398 0.059 2.54 0.230 0.068
Awarded Credits 1.58 0.293 0.068 2.06 0.145 0.079
Bagrut Rate 0.46 0.051 0.020 0.46 0.037 0.018
Note: The table reports treatment-control differences for the three outcomes in English and Math. The sample used to produce the 
results reported in this table are those of Table 3. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the school level using formulas in 
Liang and Zeger (1986) and presented in parenthesis. Students level controls include the number of sibblings, gender dummy, 
father's and mother's education, a dummy indicating an immigrant student, a set of dummy variables for ethnic background, a set of 
dummies for the number of credit units gained in the relevant subject before treatment, overall credit units gained before treatment 
and the average score in the relevant tests.
Table 4
The Treatment Effect Estimated By the Propensity Score Matched Sample
Math English1st quartile 2nd quartile 3rd quartile 4th quartile 1st quartile 2nd quartile 3rd quartile 4th quartile
Treatment effect 0.381 0.257 0.149 0.152 0.279 0.022 -0.004 0.046
(0.063) (0.046) (0.039) (0.051) (0.058) (0.049) (0.045) (0.053)
Treatment effect 0.599 0.454 0.280 0.203 0.493 0.173 0.071 0.147
(0.099) (0.075) (0.079) (0.105) (0.105) (0.087) (0.092) (0.133)
Treatment effect 0.341 0.396 0.274 0.106 0.245 0.175 0.000 0.119
(0.082) (0.096) (0.091) (0.108) (0.103) (0.100) (0.108) (0.140)
Treatment effect 0.041 0.104 0.026 0.047 0.031 0.086 0.018 0.034
(0.020) (0.030) (0.028) (0.034) (0.020) (0.025) (0.024) (0.033)
0.766
Note: The table reports treatment effects for Math and English outcomes.The samples used in this table are identical to those used in Table 
2. Treatment effects vary by quartile of summary Bagrut score through December 2000. Standard errors in parenthesis are adjusted for 
clustering at the school level using formulas in Liang and Zeger (1986). All models control for the student's and school characteristics that 
appear in Table 6 and also school fixed effects.
2.488 2.673
Bagrut rate





Control group mean 0.452 1.353 1.927 2.600 0.995 2.097
1.054 0.915
Attempted credits
Control group mean 0.888 1.915 2.343 2.810 1.579 2.692
1.341 1.431 0.851 1.194
Attempted exams
Control group mean 0.582 1.179
Table 5
Effects on English and Math Bagrut Outcomes by Quartiles of Previous Test Scores, Propensity Score Matched Sample
Estimates by quartile: Math Estimates by quartile: EnglishAll Schools Eligible Schools All Schools Eligible Schools
Father's education 0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
Mother's education 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Number of sibblings 0.003 0.005 0.001 0.004
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004)
Gender (Male=1) -0.003 -0.021 -0.005 -0.016
(0.013) (0.033) (0.013) (0.033)
Immigrant -0.035 -0.132 -0.002 -0.459*
(0.036) (0.093) (0.045) (0.164)
Math credits -0.002 -0.011 0.000 0.001
(0.004) (0.013) (0.004) (0.013)
English credits 0.006 0.066 0.013 0.089*
(0.009) (0.037) (0.008) (0.040)
History credits 0.004 0.050 0.004 0.028
(0.009) (0.027) (0.007) (0.017)
Biology credits -0.085 0.204 -0.116* 0.148
(0.059) (0.204) (0.064) (0.152)
Total credits 0.000 -0.004 0.001 0.002
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004)
Average score 0.000 0.000 0.0006* 0.001
(0.000) (0.001) (0.0003) (0.001)
Religious schools -0.006 -0.025 -0.006 -0.025
(0.007) (0.016) (0.007) (0.016)
Arab school 0.025* 0.024 0.025* 0.024
(0.009) (0.019) (0.009) (0.019)




Note: The coefficents presented in the table are based on regressions of the 1999 measurement error on 
student's characteristics and lagged Bagrut outcomes and school's characteristics. The data used are school 
sample means and regular standard errors are presented in parenthesis. A * denotes significance level at 
5% or 10%.
Table 6
Estimated Correlations Between the 1999 Measurement Error in the School Matriculation Rate 
and Student's and School's Characteristics




Father's education 10.337 10.129 0.208 10.188 11.054 -0.865
(1.007) (0.757)
Mother's education 10.315 10.340 -0.024 10.181 10.280 -0.099
(1.061) (1.082)
Number of sibblings 3.058 2.406 0.653* 3.053 1.993 1.061*
(0.351) (0.389)
Gender (Male=1) 0.494 0.505 -0.011 0.534 0.517 0.018
(0.058) (0.057)
Immigrant 0.017 0.029 -0.011 0.015 0.014 0.001
(0.027) (0.014)
Asia-Africa ethnicity 0.228 0.287 -0.059 0.216 0.260 -0.045
(0.057) (0.047)
Math credits 0.375 0.557 -0.182 0.320 0.583 -0.264
(0.178) (0.153)
English credits 0.175 0.148 0.026 0.138 0.123 0.015
(0.060) (0.083)
History credits 0.131 0.403 -0.271* 0.353 0.775 -0.422*
(0.084) (0.161)
Biology credits 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Total credits 4.055 4.256 -0.201 4.111 4.420 -0.309
(0.443) (0.413)
Religious school 0.296 0.205 0.091 0.307 0.206 0.102
(0.158) (0.160)
Arab school 0.165 0.000 0.165 0.164 0.000 0.164
(0.098) (0.100)
Previous year Bagrut rate 0.501 0.552 -0.051 0.479 0.498 -0.019
(1999,2000) (0.032) (0.041)
Number of observations 2,405 1,773 2,350 1,678
Table 7
 Descriptive Statistics: The Regression Discontinuity - Natural Experiment Sample
Year 2000 Year 2001
Note: The table reports the mean of all variables by treatment and control, the differences of means and their 


















Control group mean 1.04 1.93 1.46 0.94 2.66 2.11
Control for correct 0.078 0.135 0.256 0.027 0.224 0.361
matriculation rate (0.030) (0.058) (0.076) (0.038) (0.103) (0.111)
No control for correct 0.079 0.125 0.163 0.035 0.194 0.327
matriculation rate (0.032) (0.051) (0.068) (0.031) (0.087) (0.104)
Math English
Note: The table reports treatment-control differences for the three outcomes in English and Math. Standard errors are 
adjusted for clustering at the school level using formulas in Liang and Zeger (1986) and presented in parenthesis. The 
sample include 4,178 students of year 2000 and 4,028 students of year 2001 (same samples of Table 7). Students level 
controls include the number of sibblings, gender dummy, father's and mother's education, a dummy indicating an 
immigrant student, a set of dummy variables for ethnic background, a set of dummies for the number of credit units 
gained in the relevant subject before treatment, overall credit units gained before treatment and the average score in the 
relevant tests. School fixed effects are included as well in each of the regressions.
Table 8
The Treatment Effect on English and Math Bagrut Outcomes Estimated Using the Regression Discontinuity - Natural 
Experiment Sample1st quartile 2nd quartile 3rd quartile 4th quartile 1st quartile 2nd quartile 3rd quartile 4th quartile
Treatment effect 0.081 0.184 0.017 -0.036 0.093 -0.009 -0.053 -0.009
(0.083) (0.056) (0.060) (0.067) (0.095) (0.058) (0.073) (0.078)
Treatment effect 0.214 0.365 0.063 -0.141 0.497 0.357 0.020 -0.127
(0.123) (0.105) (0.097) (0.123) (0.186) (0.141) (0.160) (0.205)
Treatment effect 0.258 0.499 0.334 -0.011 0.707 0.581 0.095 -0.084
(0.114) (0.103) (0.102) (0.114) (0.160) (0.151) (0.153) (0.171)
Treatment effect 0.027 0.076 0.013 -0.064 * * * *
(0.028) (0.038) (0.031) (0.035) * * * *
* The estimates for the Bagrut rate are the same for Math and English because it is the same outcome in an identical sample of students.
*
Note: The table reports treatment effects for Math and English outcomes. Treatment effects vary by quartile of summary Bagrut score through December 
2000. Standard errors in parenthesis are adjusted for clustering at the school level using formulas in Liang and Zeger (1986). Sample identical to that of 
Table 8. All models control for student's and school characteristics, lagged outcomes and also school fixed effects.
2.500 2.746
Bagrut rate





Control group mean 0.347 0.973 1.627 2.550 0.911 2.007
1.024 0.858
Attempted credits
Control group mean 0.811 1.599 2.196 2.810 1.589 2.727
1.186 1.373 0.733 1.114
Attempted exams
Control group mean 0.506 0.949
Table 9
Effects on English and Math Bagrut Outcomes by Quartiles of Previous Test Scores, Using the Regression Discontinuity - Natural Experiment Sample




Father's education 11.055 10.424 0.631 10.889 10.455 0.434
(0.486) (0.511)
Mother's education 11.124 10.733 0.391 11.088 10.882 0.206
(0.561) (0.575)
Number of sibblings 2.609 2.427 0.182 2.552 2.131 0.421
(0.344) (0.393)
Gender (Male=1) 0.492 0.468 0.024 0.498 0.488 0.010
(0.066) (0.062)
Immigrant 0.013 0.045 -0.032 0.013 0.008 0.005
(0.022) (0.007)
Asia-Africa ethnicity 0.218 0.319 -0.101 0.211 0.287 -0.077
(0.050) (0.054)
Math credits 0.229 0.568 -0.339* 0.265 0.578 -0.312
(0.147) (0.176)
English credits 0.208 0.088 0.120* 0.185 0.125 0.060
(0.061) (0.090)
History credits 0.155 0.176 -0.022 0.434 0.567 -0.133
(0.084) (0.149)
Biology credits 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Total credits 4.044 4.499 -0.455 4.230 4.594 -0.364
(0.346) (0.388)
Religious school 0.098 0.325 -0.227 0.092 0.309 -0.217
(0.152) (0.150)
Arab school 0.128 0.000 0.128 0.128 0.000 0.128
(0.090) (0.091)
Previous year Bagrut rate 0.483 0.537 -0.054 0.482 0.507 -0.025
(1999,2000) (0.016) (0.042)
1999 measured with error 0.426 0.488 -0.061 - - -
Bagrut rate (0.011)
Number of observations 2,523 1,564 2,535 1,406
Table 10
 Descriptive Statistics: The Sharp Regression Discontinuity Sample
Year 2000 Year 2001
Note: The table reports the mean of all variables by treatment and control, the differences of means and their 


















Control group mean 1.01 1.86 1.39 0.86 2.46 1.95
Control for correct 0.047 0.100 0.244 0.129 0.212 0.177
matriculation rate (0.030) (0.056) (0.078) (0.031) (0.081) (0.104)
No control for correct 0.046 0.093 0.231 0.132 0.199 0.177
matriculation rate (0.032) (0.058) (0.079) (0.030) (0.079) (0.108)
Math English
Note: The table reports treatment-control differences for the three outcomes for English and Math. Standard errors are adjusted 
for clustering at the school level using formulas in Liang and Zeger (1986) and presented in parenthesis. The sample include 
4,087 students of year 2000 and 3,941 students of year 2001 (same samples of Table 10). Students level controls include the 
number of sibblings, gender dummy, father's and mother's education, a dummy indicating an immigrant student, a set of 
dummy variables for ethnic background, a set of dummies for the number of credit units gained in the relevant subject before 
treatment, overall credit units gained before treatment and the average score in the relevant tests.
Table 11
The Treatment Effect on English and Math Bagrut Outcomes Estimated Using the Sharp Regression Discontinuity Sample1st quartile 2nd quartile 3rd quartile 4th quartile 1st quartile 2nd quartile 3rd quartile 4th quartile
Treatment effect -0.199 0.192 0.144 0.095 0.156 0.166 0.060 0.132
(0.075) (0.059) (0.052) (0.064) (0.088) (0.056) (0.057) (0.070)
Treatment effect 0.090 0.246 0.125 -0.068 0.313 0.414 -0.016 0.132
(0.124) (0.114) (0.087) (0.118) (0.171) (0.089) (0.130) (0.179)
Treatment effect 0.165 0.361 0.391 0.060 0.375 0.435 -0.100 -0.030
(0.118) (0.114) (0.093) (0.111) (0.161) (0.132) (0.137) (0.167)
Treatment effect 0.044 0.089 0.036 -0.020 * * * *
(0.023) (0.030) (0.026) (0.034) * * * *




Control group mean 0.063 0.380 0.690 0.831 * *
2.992
*
1.633 2.372 0.886 1.877
Awarded credits
Control group mean 0.406 1.019
0.708
Attempted credits
Control group mean 0.898 1.653 2.132 2.628 1.549 2.574 2.614
1.322 0.670 1.060 0.981
Note: The table reports treatment effects for Math and English outcomes. Treatment effects vary by quartile of summary Bagrut score through 
December 2000. Standard errors in parenthesis are adjusted for clustering at the school level using formulas in Liang and Zeger (1986). 
Sample identical to that of Table 11. All models control for the student's and school characteristics, lagged outcomes and also school fixed 
effects.
Table 12
Effects on English and Math Bagrut Outcomes by Quartiles of Previous Test Scores, the Sharp Regression Discontinuity Sample
Estimates by quartile: Math Estimates by quartile: English
Attempted exams




















Attempted exams 0.447 0.161 0.722 0.161 3.736 0.205
(0.088) (0.085) (0.171)
Attempted credits 0.472 0.150 0.065 0.044 7.787 0.468
(0.087) (0.032) (0.242)
Awarded credits 0.303 0.027 0.029 0.016 4.230 0.054
(0.046) (0.019) (0.193)
Propensity Score Matching
Attempted exams 0.345 0.158 0.573 0.156 3.643 0.165
(0.084) (0.090) (0.187)
Attempted credits 0.375 0.145 0.053 0.062 7.808 0.495
(0.084) (0.034) (0.252)
Awarded credits 0.229 0.020 0.029 0.024 3.947 0.013
(0.046) (0.019) (0.196)
RD - Natural Experiment
Attempted exams 0.146 -0.084 0.629 0.111 2.786 0.258
(0.041) (0.102) (0.198)
Attempted credits 0.148 -0.066 0.011 0.251 6.216 0.063
(0.040) (0.135) (0.241)
Awarded credits 0.089 -0.077 0.008 0.136 2.688 0.282
(0.042) (0.088) (0.194)
Sharp RD
Attempted exams 0.206 0.138 0.351 0.146 2.888 0.151
(0.084) (0.089) (0.205)
Attempted credits 0.206 0.160 0.018 -0.114 6.638 0.020
(0.083) (0.146) (0.184)
Awarded credits 0.144 0.064 0.003 -0.140 2.848 -0.059
(0.079) (0.075) (0.172)
Table 13
Program Effect on Untreated Subjects Estimated with Various Methods
Note: The table reports treatment-control differences for the three outcomes for History, Biology and all untreated 
subjects (including History and Biology). Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the school level using 
formulas in Liang and Zeger (1986) and presented in parenthesis. The OLS sample is 72,378 (identical to the 
English sample in Table 2). The propensity score matching results are based on the PSM English sample (identical 
to the English sample in Table 3).













Teaching in small groups 0.596 0.122* 0.665 0.007
(0.052) (0.050)
Individualized instruction 0.559 0.148* 0.645 -0.027
(0.052) (0.046)
Tracking by ability 0.429 0.232* 0.404 0.151*
(0.053) (0.048)
Adapting teaching methods 0.938 0.051 0.932 0.020
to students ability (0.020) (0.023)
Teacher's effort:
Added instruction time 0.323 0.051 0.505 -0.038
during the year (0.052) (0.048)
Number of additional instructi 4.882 0.229 4.984 1.666*
hours^ (0.761) (0.761)
Added instruction time in peri 0.211 0.203* 0.291 0.083*
before Bagrut exam (0.049) (0.045)
Teacher's additional effort
 targeted towards:
All students 0.624 -0.193* 0.708 -0.061
(0.068) (0.050)
Weak students 0.306 0.081 0.245 -0.055
(0.066) (0.044)
Average students 0.024 0.028 0.017 0.043*
(0.027) (0.020)
Strong students 0.000 0.029 0.000 0.023*
(0.018) (0.011)
Number of observations 335 427
^All the variables in the table are dummy indicators (that equal to 1 or 0) except the variables that 
are noted by a ^.
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. Asterisks denote estimates which are significantly different from 
zero at 5% significance level. The English sample includes 141 of the 168 12th grade English teachers 
that participated in the program. The Math sample includes 169 of the 203 12th grade Math teachers 
that participated in the program.
Table 14
The Effect of Pay For Performance on Teaching Methods and Teacher's Effort
English teachers Math teachersTable 15: Estimates of the Effect of Incentives Program On Grading Ethics
English Math
2000 2001 2000 2001
Treated Control Diff Treated Control Diff Treated Control Diff Treated Control Diff
All schools
School-State -0.068 0.008 -0.08 -0.098 0.016 -0.11 -0.019 0.004 -0.02 -0.042 0.002 -0.04
score diff. (0.054) (0.016) (0.057) (0.055) (0.016) (0.057) (0.047) (0.013) (0.049) (0.045) (0.013) (0.047)
Schools 47 486 47 484 47 483 47 484
Students 6,285 66,338 5,565 53,328 7,181 81,183 6,862 73,969
Measurement error sample
School-State -0.059 0.042 -0.1 -0.003 0.064 -0.07 0.031 0.127 -0.1 0.012 0.128 -0.12
score diff. (0.074) (0.107) (0.130) (0.081) (0.054) (0.096) (0.073) (0.078) (0.106) (0.077) (0.089) (0.145)
Schools 17 11 17 11 17 11 17 11
Students 2,366 1,777 2,068 1,412 2,872 2,037 2,795 1,727
Discontinuity sample
School-State -0.156 0.068 -0.22 -0.099 0.054 -0.15 -0.004 0.089 -0.09 -0.039 0.202 -0.24
score diff. (0.058) (0.104) (0.119) (0.058) (0.064) (0.087) (0.058) (0.090) (0.107) (0.065) (0.091) (0.112)
Schools 14 11 14 11 14 11 14 11
Students 2,341 1,347 2,134 1,121 3,189 1,693 3,069 1,397
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses, corrected for intra-school correlation. Each of the entries in the table is the estimated difference between 
the school matriculation score and the score in the state matriculation exam. The entries in the columns noted 'Diff' are the difference between the 









Age 45.00 -0.697 44.20 0.301
(1.023) (1.004)
Gender (Female=1) 0.81 -0.005 0.59 -0.024
(0.044) (0.052)
Born abroad 0.62 -0.160* 0.48 0.014
(0.053) (0.053)
Teacher education:
Teacher certificate 0.02 0.025 0.03 0.049
(0.016) (0.019)
B.A in education 0.09 0.012 0.08 0.070
(0.031) (0.028)
B.A 0.46 -0.066 0.41 0.024
(0.056) (0.052)
M.A + Ph.d 0.43 0.034 0.47 -0.143
(0.055) (0.052)
Teaching experience (years) 18.60 -1.470 19.01 -0.139
(0.982) (1.009)
Education quality:
Degree from top universities 0.18 0.089* 0.20 0.040
(0.042) (0.043)
Degree from other universities 0.33 0.004 0.33 0.048
(0.053) (0.050)
Degree from teacher colleges 0.08 -0.020 0.10 -0.045
(0.031) (0.032)
Degree from overseas universities 0.41 -0.067 0.36 -0.050
(0.055) (0.051)
Number of observations 329 358
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. Asteriskes denote estimates which are significantly different from zero at 5% 
significance level. The English sample includes 141 of the 168 12th grade English teachers that participated in the 
program. The Math sample includes 169 of the 203 12th grade Math teachers that participated in the program. Top 
universities: Hebrew University in Jerusalem, Tel-Aviv, Technion and Weizman Institute. Other Universities: Bar-
Ilan, Ben Gurion and Haifa university.
Table A1
Teacher's Education And Demographic Characteristics
English teachers Math teachers